In the news
On 20 September, the Azerbaijani government halted military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh after reaching a ceasefire agreement with ethnic Armenian forces. According to the agreement outlined by Azerbaijan and Russia, the forces are to be disbanded and disarmed as negotiations on the future of ethnic Armenians living in the region begin on 21 September.

On 19 September, Azerbaijan launched a new military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh using precision weapons to target Armenian firing posts and other regional military facilities. A statement from Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defence claimed: “local anti-terrorist” operations in Nagorno-Karabakh were launched to “disarm and secure the withdrawal of Armenia’s armed formations” from its territory. The Ministry added: “As part of the activities, only legitimate military installations and infrastructure are targeted and incapacitated using high-precision weapons.” Further, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement declaring that the “dissolution” of the unrecognised pro-Armenian government in the region would “achieve peace and stability.”

Issues at large
First, the resumption of large-scale military operations. The scale of operations launched by Azerbaijan was the largest since the six-week conflict with Armenia in 2020. Azerbaijan’s army claimed it had captured over 90 positions from the ethnic Armenians. The tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh have continued despite the ceasefire agreement reached in 2020 with frequent skirmishes and fighting at several posts in the region. The situation worsened with Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin Corridor, the mountain road linking Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. 

Second, Azerbaijan’s claims over Nagorno-Karabakh. Over the recent past, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev has been assertive in his rhetoric over the region, despite Armenia recognising that the region is the sovereign territory of Azerbaijan. In May, Aliyev said about the ethnic Armenians: “Either they will bend their necks and come themselves, or things will develop differently.” This aggression was seen in the recent developments when he called for “the dissolution of the puppet regime” in Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Third, the dwindling status of the unrecognised Republic of Artsakh. The unrecognised government in Nagorno-Karabakh, or the Republic of Artsakh, has claimed to be under “intense fire,” describing Azerbaijan’s actions as the start of a “large-scale military offensive” and accusing them of “typical ethnic cleansing operations.” Its troops have also come under fire during the recent skirmishes, causing them to surrender and agree to the recent ceasefire agreement. Meanwhile, Armenia has indirectly distanced itself from the region as Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan claimed that the country does not participate in military operations, reiterating that they do not have an army in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Fourth, the inability of the Russian peacekeeping forces. Russia has deployed around 2,000 soldiers as peacekeeping forces along the Lachin corridor under a five-year mandate. However, its role in the region has been questioned since the beginning due to its lack of intervention in maintaining peace. Additionally, Russia's preoccupation with Ukraine and the Armenian-Russian tensions have also affected its influence in the region.

Fifth, stalled negotiations. Azerbaijan and Armenia have been engaged in high-level talks since 2020. These talks have been brokered by Russia, the United States and the European Union. Despite the willingness to negotiate, these talks continued to be stalled due to the lack of consensus on key issues, including the fate of ethnic Armenians and the demarcation of the borders between the two countries. 

In perspective
First, the risk of another military conflict. The risk of a full-blown military conflict is unlikely due to the unbalanced dynamics. Unlike in 2020, the regional geopolitics have changed; Armenia has taken a less assertive stance due to the lack of support from the public and Russia and is therefore not able to wage a full-scale conflict. Conversely, Azerbaijan has strategically used aggression to consolidate its position in the region. The tension in the form of low-intensity skirmishes will likely continue with the possibility of a mass exodus shortly. 

Second, the difficulties in addressing the issues. The two sides have been brought closer due to the ongoing negotiations; however, the renewed fighting indicates that the diplomatic efforts have failed to reach a sustainable peace agreement. Since 2020, the ceasefire agreements have been criticised for being lopsided, and unable to address the obstacles that continue to disturb the region. Additionally, the exclusion of the ethnic Armenian authorities in the negotiations is also a lacuna that needs to be addressed.

Third, the role of external actors. The US, the EU, Turkey, and Russia will continue to play a mediating role in the conflict. However, it is unclear to what extent these countries would contribute in resolving the issue. For now, the US and the EU have taken up a prominent role in the peace negotiations, while Russia's intervention is limited. Conversely, Turkey would continue to be an ardent supporter of Azerbaijan. However, the power politics over the region is yet to manifest itself.